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ABSTRACT   
 
Shareholding size is a poor proxy for corporate control. At best it reflects an investor’s 
wealth relative to other shareholders and, most importantly, the distribution of rights to a 
company’s worth and the related exposure to risk. Shareholding size does not actually 
show an investor’s strength in corporate control. As an alternative, this paper espouses 
the merits of the voting power concept and promotes two indices associated with it: the 
Penrose-Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index. This paper further introduces a 
new framework that compares the strength of corporate control against the size of 
corporate shareholding. Illustrating this idea using a group of government-linked 
companies (GLCs), this study yielded two possible ways in which the government can 
consolidate its control. 
 
Keywords: corporate analysis, voting power, Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, government 
linked companies 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper begins by posing a question: in corporate analysis, how do you best 
measure control? As the practice stands, a researcher decides between two 
choices; corporate shareholding size and voting power. The former is typically 
used to analyse corporate control. For example, Ishak and Napier (2006), 
Norman, Mara and Mohamat (2009), and Ting and Lean (2011) have taken this 
route. Nevertheless, as this study will illustrate, the voting power concept is 
theoretically superior to corporate shareholding size when analysing corporate 
control. Studies by Crama and Leruth (2013), Chakravarty and Hodgkinson 
(2001) and Leech (2002) should be commended for employing the proper line of 
analysis.  
 
The reason is simply because shareholding size and voting power 
approaches have different focuses. Shareholding size focuses on an investor’s 
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wealth relative to other shareholders and, most importantly, on the distribution of 
the rights to a company’s worth as well as its risks. This right can be further 
classified into rights to the company’s assets (and liability; hence, the risk) and 
the right to a certain percentage of votes at the company’s meeting, typically 
known as the shareholder’s cash flow rights and voting rights, respectively (e.g., 
Becht & Mayer, 2001; Ishak & Napier, 2006). A distinguishing feature over the 
voting power approach is that this right remains exactly similar to the percentage 
of shareholding.   
 
The size of shareholding1 
 
does not reflect the degree of shareholder 
control over corporate matters. In other words, a shareholder can have 
substantially more or substantially less corporate control than the percentage of 
shareholding may suggest. Consider the example of a company with three 
shareholders where the first shareholder owns 70% of the shares, the second 
shareholder owns 20% and the third shareholder owns the remaining 10% of the 
shares. If only shareholding size is examined, it would appear that the degree of 
control for the each of the three investors is in proportion to the percentage of 
their shareholdings. This can be a confusing situation. In reality, the smallest 
shareholder will always lose whereas the largest shareholder will always be 
victorious in a corporate election. The largest shareholder controls the outcome of 
the annual general meeting and any emergency meetings, venues where key 
corporate decisions are endorsed. The smaller shareholders become powerless. 
Therefore, the 7:2:1 ratio does not properly reflect the true distribution of power. 
The true ratio in a simple majority rule system is 1:0:0.  
Now consider a change in the shareholdings distribution. This time the 
largest shareholder owns 48% of the shares leaving the second and third 
shareholders each with 26% of the shares. At first glance, the largest shareholder 
appears to be in clear command of any voting exercise. Nevertheless, the actual 
power is now spread evenly; 0.5:0.5:0.5. Smaller shareholders can therefore share 
equal power to that of largest shareholder (later sections will explain the 
mechanics behind these power spreads). 
 
Two recent news items surrounding Bursa Malaysia-listed companies, 
Hong Leong Capital Bhd. and MISC Bhd., are legitimate real-world voting 
exercises in which small shareholders had equal power to that of the larger 
shareholders. In these cases, the premise was that the minority shareholders were 
spread somewhat thinly whereas the largest shareholders owned close to 80% and 
63% of the shares, respectively, and wished to de-list the companies from the 
bourse. Resolutions were tabled, and buyout offers of RM1.71 and RM5.30 per 
share, respectively, were made to entice the remaining shareholders.
  
2  
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To unsuspecting eyes, the largest shareholders appeared overwhelmingly 
powerful and the thinly spread shareholders were powerless, until events took 
their course. Both of the attempts failed. This disappointment was due not least to 
a dispute over the offer price but also to a much bigger hurdle than that 
experienced in other resolutions. De-listing, as described in Chapter 16 of the 
Bursa Malaysia Listing Rules (Bursa Malaysia Berhad, 2001), requires more than 
90% approval by the shareholders – a massive hurdle. The two companies needed 
a big vote of support from other shareholders, and this was not forthcoming. The 
attempt to take the companies private ended disastrously. The much smaller 
shareholders managed to scupper the de-listing move in the hopes of achieving a 
better offer price. The largest shareholders were forced to retreat to their next 
option. 
 
The outcomes of these corporate events serve as a pointer for corporate 
analysis: the largest shareholders are not always winners, nor are the smaller 
shareholders predestined losers. The link between shareholding size and the 
power that comes with it remains decided by individual situations. The 
distribution of the former is not a true picture of the latter. 
 
One particular concept that can precisely explain this link is known as the 
voting power concept – a critical technique that has been used to scrutinise the 
outcome of institutional votes. Nevertheless, despite its being a recognised 
technique, the voting power concept has not been widely understood. “Despite 
the importance of the field, it is a subject that is not studied widely enough, and is 
poorly understood outside the voting power community” (Das, 2011, p.1).  In this 
respect, this study is expected to contribute to the existing literature on corporate 
analysis in three ways: first, this study introduces and illustrates the concept of 
voting power in relation to corporate analysis; second, it introduces a new 
framework for analysing corporate control; third, it provides information on the 
extent of government control in government-linked companies (GLCs) using the 
voting power concept. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first 
study to contribute a new analytical framework and means of determining 
government control over GLCs.    
 
 
VOTING POWER 
 
The voting power concept is a field within cooperative game theory. This concept 
has been widely used in political studies and has been used to certain extent to 
analyse corporate control in developed countries by researchers such as Algaba, 
Bilbao and Fernandez (2007), Felsenthal, Machover, Leech and List (2003), and 
Kauppi and Widgren (2006). Nevertheless, the concept has been overlooked by 
many researchers in Asia, even though this concept is simple to comprehend and 
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is useful for people seriously interested in finding a better technique for the 
analysis of corporate control. 
 
A large part of the concept of voting power revolves around voting 
power indices. As the name suggests, these indices refer to the outcome of an 
election. From a corporate perspective, this includes the Annual General Meeting 
(AGM) and any Emergency General Meetings (EGMs). The results are recorded 
in the form of index that ranges from nil to one, representing the probability of 
winning an election. If the voting power of a shareholder voting is expressed as 
nil or ‘0’, it indicates that the shareholder has no chance of winning a particular 
election.  On the other hand, if a shareholder’s voting power is represented as ‘1,’ 
it indicates that the chance that the shareholder will win an election is absolute. In 
short, ‘0’ means no control, whereas ‘1’ means full control. A score between 0 
and 1 means that control is shared between the shareholders.  
 
Historically, the voting power index is accredited to Penrose (1946), who 
drew attention to an important characteristic of the concept of voting power.  
Penrose asserted that voting power was not directly correlated to shareholding 
size because these two factors are in a non-monotonic relationship with each 
other. Instead, voting power depends on the concept of probability. A voter’s 
chance of winning is not based solely on the size of his shareholding but is also 
influenced by the distribution of the remaining shares and the winning quota or 
majority rule. Consequently, a striking characteristic of the concept of voting 
power is the non-monotonicity of the resulting index. This index can be used to 
explain how small shareholders can have voting power that is equal to that of 
larger shareholders. The following section and Table 1 describe this dynamic in 
greater detail. 
 
In a company with the following share distribution: ‘A’ – 42.9%,          
‘B’ – 47.2% and ‘C’ – 9.9% and where the winning quota is a simple majority 
(i.e., more than 50% of the votes), ‘C’ enjoys voting power equal to that of ‘A’ 
and ‘B’ with an index score of 0.5, even though ‘C’ is more than 4 times smaller 
than the other 2 shareholders (Table 1, Scenario 1). In the second situation, 
shareholder ‘A’ has increased his shares to 51%; consequently, the voting power 
of ‘B’ and ‘C’ drops to nil (Table 1, Scenario 2). Finally, if the winning quota is 
amended from a simple majority to super majority (more than 66.6%), ‘B’s’ 
voting power reverts to 0.5 (Table 1, Situation 3).  
 
The non-monotonicity of the voting power index emphasises the central 
point; it is misleading to equate corporate control with the size of share 
ownership. In Scenarios 1 and 3, the largest shareholders did not enjoy the 
greatest voting power. In fact, other shareholders have equal voting power. The 
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two most widely used indices, the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index, 
share this attribute. 
 
 
Table 1 
Example-share of right and risk vs. voting power 
 
Note: 1 as measured using the Penrose-Banzhaf index;  S/holder – shareholder; O/Ship – ownership. 
 
 
The Shapley-Shubik Index  
 
The Shapley-Shubik index (1954) remains one of the most widely used voting 
power indices. Conceptually, the Shapley-Shubik index measures power based on 
the probability of a player playing a pivotal role in all possible coalitions drawn 
from a pool that includes all voters. A role is seen as pivotal when the arrival of 
the shareholder results in the formation of a winning coalition. A shareholder 
whose vote results in a winning coalition is called a pivotal shareholder.  
 
The role of shareholders in coalitions is an important assumption made 
by the Shapley-Shubik index (Straffin, 1977). In the context of corporate 
elections, this assumption is similar to assuming that each shareholder takes a 
voting turn and that the aggregate is tallied immediately after each turn. 
Shareholders who vote after a pivotal shareholder are described as dummies 
because the winning coalition has already been formed and their votes are 
essentially meaningless. Consequently, in each winning coalition, only one pivot 
can occur. Therefore, the total number of pivots always equals the number of 
coalitions, and the sum of the index always reaches unity. In the voting power 
fraternity, this index is known to be normalised, which is a useful feature because 
it permits inter-voting body comparisons. This ability eases comparisons just as 
results that have been transformed into percentages are easier to visualise than 
results displayed as absolute values. 
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Table 2 illustrates how each shareholder can play a pivotal role in two 
coalitions. Six coalitions are shown in Table 2, and the Shapley-Shubik index for 
each shareholder is 0.33.    
 
Table 2 
The Shapley-Shubik Index – determining pivotal shareholders 
 
Arrivals 
Pivotal shareholder 
1st 2nd 3rd 
A B C B 
A C B C 
B A C A 
B C A C 
C A B A 
C B A B 
 
Note: A – 42.9%; B – 47.2%; C – 9.9%.  The majority required to win an election is set at greater than 50%. 
 
 
The Penrose-Banzhaf Index 
 
The Penrose index (1946) is another widely used voting power index. This index 
defines voting power as the frequency with which a shareholder is an important 
member or a pivotal player in the number of coalitions involving that 
shareholder. The idea of order or arrival (as used in Shapley-Shubik) is not used 
when defining a pivotal voter in this index. In other words, as long as a 
shareholder is needed to form a winning coalition, that time at which he arrives to 
vote is irrelevant. In addition, as in the Penrose-Banzhaf index, if more than one 
shareholder is needed to form a winning coalition, all of the shareholders are 
defined as important shareholders. Consequently, there can be a greater number 
of important members than the number of winning coalitions, leading to an index 
that does not always sum to unity; thus, the index stays in absolute form. In the 
context of a corporate election, ignoring the order of shareholder arrival is 
equivalent to assuming that shareholders vote simultaneously. 
 
The Banzhaf index (1965) is closely related to the Penrose index. 
Although the frequency of a voter playing a pivotal role remains the same, the 
Penrose index defines the voting power as the number of times that a shareholder 
plays a pivotal role over the total number of coalitions involving that shareholder, 
whereas the Banzhaf index defines a pivotal role by examining the frequency of 
pivots over the total number of pivots. Changing the denominator of the Banzhaf 
index leads to results similar to those achieved using the Penrose index; hence the 
name, the Penrose-Banzhaf index. Because the aggregate frequency of pivotal 
roles remains equal to the total number of pivots, the Banzhaf index is 
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normalised. This normalised form of the index creates a weakness because it fails 
to reflect the true distribution of voting power in the same way that percentages 
may hide actual values (Felsenthal & Machover, 2004).  
 
Table 3 illustrates pivotal roles. Each shareholder can be seen as being 
pivotal on two occasions. The Penrose-Banzhaf index gives each shareholder a 
pivotal role twice, and each shareholder is involved in four coalitions (i.e., 2n–1).  
The index for each shareholder is calculated as 2/4 or 0.50. The Banzhaf index 
uses the two pivotal roles played by each shareholder and their aggregate totals 
(i.e., six) to determine an index value of 2/6 for ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’.   
 
 
Table 3 
The Penrose-Banzhaf index – determining pivotal shareholders 
Note: A – 42.9%; B – 47.2%; C – 9.9%.  The majority required to win an election is set at greater than 50%. 
 
 
Table 4 summarises the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices and the 
extent of control. In this example, all the voting power indices are less than one, 
but none are nil. None of the shareholders has absolute control, but none is 
powerless. Control is shared among the shareholders.  
 
 
Table 4 
Summary of voting power indices and the extent of control 
Shareholders Size 
Shapley- 
Shubik 
Extent of                
control 
Penrose- 
Banzhaf 
Extent of 
control 
A      42.9% 0.33 Shared 0.50 Shared 
B      47.2% 0.33 Shared 0.50 Shared 
C        9.9% 0.33 Shared 0.50 Shared 
 
A similarity between many studies is that the concepts are illustrated in 
mathematical language, resulting in an abstract discussion of the concepts 
involved. It is possible, however, to dispense with mathematical language, as 
demonstrated by Chakravarty and Hodgkinson (2001), and Felsenthal and 
Machover (2004). This paper adopts a similar approach by keeping the technical 
aspects to a minimum.  
Winning coalitions, pivotal shareholder (underlined) 
A B  
A C  
B C  
C B A 
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ISSUES RELATED TO THE VOTING POWER CONCEPT AND INDEX 
 
As has been the custom with many concepts, the notion of voting power is not 
devoid of controversy. A review of the literature points to three main concerns: 
resistance to the concept, the a-priori boundary, and finally, the intuitive 
meanings of the index.  
 
Voter’s Behaviour 
 
The concept of voting power has been criticised by Garrett and Tsebelis (1999; 
2001) and Albert (2003) as faulty because it fails to imitate voter behaviour. To 
qualify as a scientific concept, voting power should be able to predict and explain 
human behaviour and, eventually, should be able to be used to approve or reject a 
theory. The voting power fraternity allegedly fails to address this matter, and the 
indices are therefore seen as meaningless.  
 
One of the perceived failures of the concept of voting power is its 
inability to explain a voter’s preference and policy arrangement. The index only 
considers two factors, the size of shareholdings and the winning quota, and pays 
no heed to the fact that voters form coalitions (Garrett & Tsebelis, 1999). Hence, 
political scientists and constitutional analysis researchers should disregard the 
voting power index (Albert, 2003). Subsequently, if one accepts this opinion, the 
voting power concept would have only very limited application in corporate 
analysis.  
 
Contrary to the views expressed by voting power critics, Machover 
(2000), Leech (2003) and Felsenthal et al. (2003) defended the concept. Their 
central argument was based on the usefulness of the voting power concept in its 
a-priori form, and this form should be based on only two decision rules: a voter’s 
size (or weight) and the winning quota. The design of the index should ignore the 
voter’s preference in the same way that institutional constitutions ignore voters’ 
preferences. In the context of corporate analysis, the company’s constitution or 
charter indicates the number of votes required for a simple or super majority, 
regardless of the possible shareholder coalitions. In any event, human behaviour 
can be extremely unpredictable. A friendly shareholder can, under different 
circumstances, become a rival. Additionally, voting independently rather than as 
part of a coalition reflects sovereignty and is the basic right of every voter 
(Felsenthal et al., 2003). At present, a a-priori formulations based on voter weight 
and quota are widely accepted.   
 
Another group of sceptics argue from a social perspective. The meaning 
of power is more extensive and complicated than indicated by the size of a 
voter’s shareholdings and winning quotas (Napel & Widgren, 2005). A-priori 
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methods, for example, should consider the significance of various employee roles 
in an organisation (Braham & Steffen, 2002), together with prior discussions, 
influence over other voters and restrictions on forming coalitions (Holler & 
Napel, 2004). Currently, the behavioural dimension of social behaviour in the 
description of a-priori has been lost (Napel & Widgren, 2005). The prospect of a 
final solution to this question, much like finding a solution to the philosophical 
debates on the meaning of ‘power’3
 
, remains unlikely. 
Rankings and Intuitive Meanings 
 
Indices do not always produce similar rankings due to the varied assumptions 
entailed in the construction of each index. As an example, in a company with a 
limited large shareholder but an abundance of small shareholders (Straffin, 1977), 
an undesirable result based on two different conclusions may appear following 
two different rankings.  
 
This observation encourages discussion on the merits of each index. An 
important discussion concerns the intuitive meaning of each index (Felsenthal & 
Machover, 2001; 2004). When Shapley and Shubik investigated the issue of 
voting power, they were concerned with the distribution of rewards, and they 
measured this by adapting a technique termed the Shapley value4
 
                               
(Felsenthal & Machover, 2004). This technique was later adapted to become the 
Shapley-Shubik index. The concept of power, as contained within this index, 
refers to a reward, payoff or prize and has also been referred to as the P-Power 
(Felsenthal & Machover, 1998). In the Shapley-Shubik index, voting power 
refers to reward instead of influence. Accordingly, in studies that focus on the 
distribution of rewards, for example, in corporate take-overs, the Shapley-Shubik 
index is the best choice. Chakravarty and Hodgkinson (2001, p. 91) stated, 
“Winning coalitions gain rent and a player who is a pivot, turning a coalition into 
a winning coalition by her presence, can obtain a share of the spoils for doing so. 
Perceived in this way, the battle for the control of management is not a battle to 
monitor the behaviour of management. This index may be appropriate in studying 
take-over bids, which we do not investigate here”. Take-over bids are examined 
in Chakravarty and Hodgkinson (2001). In this context, dividend allocations, the 
issuance of bonus shares and the spoils from liquidation exercises can be taken as 
extended examples of these rewards.   
In contrast, when Penrose and Banzhaf investigated voting power, the 
focus was on influence, termed I-Power (Felsenthal & Machover, 1998). The 
winner of an election can influence the policies that will affect the voting body. 
Accordingly, if influence is more important than reward, then the Penrose-
Banzhaf index is a better choice for examining corporate control. In perspective, 
if the main focus of a study is reward, then the Shapley-Shubik index is a better 
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fit; however, if the focus is influence over a company’s management, then the 
Banzhaf index is the appropriate choice. 
 
The Shapley-Shubik index, however, does not distribute rewards in a 
convincing manner (Felsenthal & Machover, 2004). It is erroneous to assume that 
only pivotal members will gain rewards and that the other members in the 
winning coalition will receive no reward. In practice, all members of the winning 
coalition are rewarded, not only the pivotal members. This assumption is “[i] 
widespread but erroneous” (Felsenthal & Machover, 2004, p. 19).  
However, Turnovec, Mercik and Mazurkiewicz (2004) rejected the 
argument that the Shapley-Shubik index reflects P-Power and call on its 
supporters to justify the distribution of rewards. The detractors note that the index 
can also be defined from the perspective of probability, and there is little need to 
justify this meaning and distribution. It is a matter of probability that a voter will 
be in pivotal situation whilst in the “process of forming a winning configuration” 
(Turnovec et al., 2004, p. 5). This index has been successfully used by 
researchers such as Eckbo and Verma (1993), and Kauppi and Widgren (2004). 
In some studies, both the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices were tested for 
correlation (e.g., Chen [2004]).  
 
Equally, the idea of intuitive meaning has also received support. The 
meanings of the indices have been discussed, and the concept of I-Power and the 
Banzhaf index in absolute form are accepted as appropriate by Chakravarty and 
Hodgkinson (2001) and Algaba et al. (2007). On the other hand, Kauppi and 
Widgren (2004) preferred the Shapley-Shubik index because the underlying 
meanings best reflected the subject of their studies. 
 
While not denying that the ideas behind voting power indices originate 
from probability concepts, this study agrees with the idea that these indices 
reflect particular underlying meanings. For that reason, if the purpose of voting in 
an election is to demonstrate influence over a company’s policies, then the 
Banzhaf index is the most appropriate. This study also concurs with the claim 
that the Banzhaf index, given that it is normalised by definition, hides voting 
power distribution and that the Penrose-Banzhaf index is more appropriate for 
analysing corporate control.  
 
 
CORPORATE CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT-LINKED COMPANIES 
 
This study illustrates the application of the voting power concept to publicly 
listed Malaysian GLCs. GLCs were chosen because the issues they face 
command public attention and are highly politicised.  For example, GLCs have 
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been accused of representing the interests of the Bumiputera (Centre for Public 
Policy Studies, 2006). The board of GLCs appear to predominantly comprise 
members from the Bumiputera community. GLCs have also been accused of 
being retirement funds for retired senior politicians and civil servants.5 Questions 
have been raised regarding the qualifications and experience of politician and 
civil servants in undertaking these important responsibilities. GLCs are also 
highly politicised because the public perceives the performance of GLCs as 
abysmal compared to their competitors. Some popular examples include 
companies such as Proton Holdings Bhd. and Malaysian Airlines System Bhd.6  
The situation is exacerbated by the size and the popularity of these companies. 
The scientific findings, however, are mixed. The performance of GLCs is worse 
than the performance of competing non-GLCs (Abdul Razak, Rubi, & Joher, 
2011). However, reducing direct government involvement, as recently announced 
by the Performance Management and Delivery Unit (PEMANDU)7
 
 of the 
Government of Malaysia, might not be the solution. In fact, the value of a GLC 
increases with the size of government involvement (Lau & Tong, 2008). If the 
plan to reduce the amount of shares held in GLCs by the Malaysian government 
goes through, the pre and post-performance of these companies will become 
important for understanding the merits of government intervention. Against this 
backdrop, this study adds to the existing literature on GLCs, albeit centred 
towards the methodological perspective. 
All 12 GLCs listed on the Malaysian Stock market in 2010 were 
analysed. Shareholding size was determined by examining all shareholdings 
greater than 1% held by the 30 largest shareholders that were available in the 
company’s annual report. These shareholders were categorised as belonging to 
the government of Malaysia, the Bumiputera, other Malaysians and international 
investors. In this study, all institutional Bumiputera shareholders were 
categorised as a single group for practical analysis. The corporate shareholding 
size of each shareholder was then used to calculate the Penrose-Banzhaf index.  
 
This study concurs with Felsenthal and Machover (2001) in that 
distinctive meaning underlies each index. This study, therefore, adopts the 
Penrose-Banzhaf index as it best reflects the meaning of power being analysed 
(in this case, influence over the direction of the company). The alternative 
approach – which the researchers have chosen not to embrace – is to ignore this 
concept of meaning consistent with Turnovec et al. (2004). If the concept of 
meaning is disregarded, either one or both indices can be employed concurrently. 
Regarding the use of Penrose-Banzhaf index and Shapley-Shubik index, a study 
may want to test the correlation between the two sets of outcomes, similar to the 
study undertaken by Chen (2004), in which a high correlation coefficient was 
observed. This study adopts the opposite approach, in that it employs only a 
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single index; hence the result is a single set of rankings. The need to test for any 
correlation thus disappears.  
 
Moving to the outcome of the analysis, a full description of the voting 
power and the corresponding control of the GLCs is listed in Table 5. The 
analysis serves two aspects of the study: it illustrates the voting power concept 
and aids in understanding the control of GLCs. The illustration reveals that the 
size of ownership is not an ideal reflection of control. In GLC 4, the smaller 
Bumiputera shareholder has a voting power equal to that of the larger 
shareholders. In GLC 9, the much smaller Bumiputera shareholder has only a 
5.2% share but has a voting power almost equal to that of the government, whose 
shareholding size was almost 8 times larger. In other words, despite their size, 
these small shareholders have an equal ability to influence the agenda of the 
relevant GLC as the larger shareholders. Shareholding size is seen as a fragile 
proxy for corporate control; the voting power index is a superior choice. 
 
From the perspective of GLC studies, the basic discovery is that 
government operational control strength varies.  Seventy-five percent (i.e., 9) 
were under full governmental control, whereas 25% (i.e., 3) were under a shared 
form of control. This means that the government (as the largest shareholder) does 
not necessarily have a free hand in the running of a GLC. In some instances, the 
government needs help from minority shareholders to exceed the majority voting 
requirement. This support is vital for the government. To put it the other way, 
this implies the reality that other shareholders can deny the government’s wishes. 
 
This finding leads to another question; what forms of remedies are 
available for the government to ease this lack of total operational control in the 
three companies? Table 5 hints at the answers. The first form of possible remedy 
is to act through a friendly party. By teaming up with a friendly party with 
significant stakes, the total size of shareholding is technically increased, hence 
safeguarding the company’s operation from dissenting groups. This appears to be 
the remedy adopted by two of the companies. The second largest shareholders in 
these companies, the Bumiputera, are known to have close relationships with the 
government (see Centre for Public Policy Studies, 2006). In a separate matter, the 
Bumiputera are the 2nd-largest shareholder in 8 of the 12 GLCs that enjoy full 
operational control, thus allowing the government to consolidate greater control 
over these companies.  In essence, a permanent pact with a friendly party appears 
to be one of the ways to ease this lack of total control, and the friendly party is 
the Bumiputera. 
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Table 5 
GLCs: Shareholding size, voting power index (the Penrose-Banzhaf index) and control  
 
Company Major shareholder 
Share-   
holding  
size % 
Voting  
power 
Extent of  
control 
Number 
of 
influential 
minorities  
1. Telekom 
Malaysia  
Bhd. 
Government  53.3 1.00 Full 0 
Bumiputra 17.1 0.00 None  
Non-Bumiputra 1 2.6 0.00 None 
 
 
2. Axiata Group 
Bhd. 
Government  54.4 1.00 Full 0 
Bumiputra 8.0 0.00 None  
Non-Bumiputra 1 2.2 0.00 None 
 
 
3. CIMB Group 
Bhd. 
Government  44.1 0.59 Shared 5 
Foreign 1 4.6 0.28 Shared  
Foreign 2 4.1 0.22 Shared  
Foreign 3 1.9 0.16 Shared  
Foreign 4 1.5 0.09 Shared  
Foreign 5 1.3 0.03 Shared 
 
 
4. Faber Group Bhd. Government  34.3 0.5 Shared 1 
 Bumiputra 22.7 0.5 Shared  
 Non-Bumiputra 1 7.0 0.0 None  
 Foreign  1.4 0.0 None 
 
 
5. Malaysian Airline  Government  83.7 1.0 Full 0 
System Bhd. Bumiputra 
 
1.3 0.0 None  
6. Malaysia Airports  Government  63.6 1.0 Full 0 
Holding Bhd. Bumiputra 6.8 0.0 None  
 Foreign 4.0 0.0 None  
 Non-Bumiputra 1 1.9 0.0 None 
 
 
7. Pharmaniaga 
Bhd. 
Government  87.4 1.00 Full 0 
 Bumiputra 8.0 0.00 None  
 
  
(continued on next page) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
 
Company Major Shareholder 
Share-   
holding  
size % 
Voting  
Power 
Extent of  
control 
Number 
of 
influential 
minorities  
8. PLUS 
Expressway 
Government  70.5 1.0 Full 0 
Bumiputra 6.5 0.0 None  
 
9. Pos Malaysia 
Bhd. 
Government  44.9 0.56 Shared 4 
Bumiputra 5.2 0.44 Shared  
Foreign 2.9 0.06 Shared  
Non-Bumiputra 1 1.3 0.06 Shared  
Foreign 2 1.2 0.06 Shared  
 
10. Proton Holdings  Government  70.0 1.0 Full 0 
Bhd. Non-Bumiputra  5.0 0.0 None  
 Foreign 1 1.6 0.0 None  
 
11. Time dotcom  Government  62.2 1.0 Full 0 
Bhd. Non-Bumiputra 1 6.8 0.0 None  
 Foreign  1.4 0.0 None  
 
12. UEM Land  Government  72.7 1.0 Full 0 
        Holdings Bhd. Foreign 2.5 0.0 None  
Note: The extent of control in bold highlights influential minority shareholders. 
 
 
The other possible remedy available to the government is based on the 
natural state of scattered small shareholders. Although the previous form of 
control may be unsurprising and may be part of a strategic plan (i.e., it is not co-
incidental that the Bumiputera are the 2nd largest shareholders), the scenarios 
involving dispersed shareholders are less apparent. Typically, dispersed 
shareholders find it difficult to cooperate due to various factors such as the usual 
issues of free-riding by other shareholders, the prohibitive cost of gathering and 
analysing information, especially regarding the non-institutional investors, and 
the availability of cheaper and faster options to exit the companies, namely 
trading-off the shares on the bourse (see Forbes & Watson, 1993). These factors 
complicate efforts to form a dissenting and informed voting bloc. 
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This complication is likely to be more pressing in respect of GLC 3 and 
GLC 9 because they have more minority shareholders that are able to influence 
the outcome of the voting exercise than GLC 4, as evidenced by the presence of 
voting power. Precisely, as many as five and four minority shareholders have the 
ability to influence the outcome of the voting exercise in GLC 3 and GLC 9, 
respectively (Table 5, Column 6). In contrast, only one minority shareholder has 
this ability in GLC 4, despite one of the remaining minority shareholders having 
as much as 7% of the shares in the company (Table 5, Column 6). Articulation 
among the minority gets more tedious when the number of shareholders 
increases. Consider the following scenario: a shareholder in a GLC with a single 
minority shareholder has only herself in a coalition. A GLC with 4 minority 
shareholders has 8 possible coalitions (i.e., 2n–1, where n is the number of 
minority shareholders) to choose from, whereas a GLC with 5 minority 
shareholders has 16 possible coalitions to consider. These minority shareholders 
are disenfranchised by the circumstances to the benefit of the government.   
 
In short, the strength of control in GLCs varies and, for those GLCs that 
lack full operational control, the distribution of shareholders first hinted at the 
existence of a pact between friendly minority shareholders, and second, hinted at 
the natural consequence of dispersed shareholders as solutions. It is perhaps 
worth repeating that the Bumiputera is unsurprisingly the 2nd largest shareholder 
in most GLCs. The dispersed state of ownership among the minority shareholders 
is less obvious as a likely form of control. 
 
Returning to the discussion of voting power, detailed analyses of GLCs 
will be less accurate and potentially misleading without the use of the voting 
power concept. The application of this concept allows a researcher to objectively 
analyse the strength of control for both the government and minority 
shareholders. 
 
 
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
At the beginning of this paper the following question was posed: how do you best 
measure corporate control? Much effort has been taken to explain the superiority 
of the voting power concept over shareholding size. The crucial point is the 
difference in focus between the shareholding size and control approaches. These 
approaches are related but focus on two different issues. The former provides us 
with certain information on a shareholder’s slice of wealth and the related rights 
and risk but will not necessary provide information on whether that shareholder 
has control over a company. The best approach to measure corporate control is 
through the concept of voting power.  
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Accordingly, this study attempts to promote the wider application of this 
concept. The explanations and considerations that come into play when analysing 
corporate control have been presented. The Penrose-Banzhaf index remains the 
most appropriate index when studying corporate influence because this index 
clearly reflects this influence. Alternatively, the Shapley-Shubik index is suitable 
if the focus of a corporate election is to share the spoils of the company, such as 
when issuing dividends and or bonus shares.  
 
An analysis framework has been developed to facilitate the application of 
the voting power concept. GLCs were analysed to illustrate this framework, and 
the results highlighted the different control strengths within the GLCs. The 
analysis can be weakened if a study groups all GLCs into one group when in 
reality, some companies require the help of other shareholders to sanction a 
decision. The “linked” as meant in the term GLCs, varies.  
 
Critics may argue that the voting power concept fails to account for all 
factors. In the GLC scenarios used in his study, a claim can be made that “golden 
shares” may influence the state of control, and this is not considered in the voting 
power concept. Additionally, authorities can assert control over companies 
through various means from the issuing of licenses to imposing trade restrictions. 
Voting power allegedly fails to reflect such factors. This claim is unfounded for 
many reasons, the chief of which is that the entire analysis should be based on an 
a-priori assumption; i.e., the analysis should only focus on the size of 
shareholdings and majority rules (Felsenthal et al., 2003).  Only these two factors 
can be precisely identified, and it is often difficult to determine other factors. 
Additionally, these other factors can be difficult to count and might be constantly 
changing. It is wiser for the analysis to be restricted to reliable factors and for 
other factors to be ignored. The fact that a company’s constitution often ignores 
factors such as the ability to form coalitions, age, gender, preferences and 
ethnicity, and only focuses on the quota needed to pass a resolution speaks for 
itself. Consider GLCs; it is true that the government can exercise their power 
through various means. However, these actions may be counterproductive to the 
entrepreneurial spirit and investor confidence. Government attempts to control a 
company are limited. At times, other shareholders (such as foreign investors) 
may exert greater control than the government, especially when they provide 
highly sought after technology and much-needed capital. Clearly, the factors that 
influence corporate control can appear limitless and difficult to predict. The only 
factors that are reliable for use in an analysis are the size of shareholding and the 
rules governing the required majority.  
 
Nevertheless, despite the theoretical superiority of the voting power 
concept over shareholding size, not every study on corporate control should 
discard shareholding size as an analysis technique. Shareholding size is, after all, 
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simple and practical. For example, exceeding a threshold of 30% ownership 
triggers mandatory takeover bids of listed companies in many countries. This 
approach is practical because the predetermined number is easy for investors to 
understand. The drawback is that it does not necessarily reflect the strength of 
corporate control. To resolve this issue, a study can employ the voting power 
concept in tandem with corporate shareholding size. For example, in the study of 
a GLC by Ting and Lean (2011), the use of this concept allowed researchers to 
explore the link between corporate control strength and debt structure. The 
present study proved that government influence on GLCs is present at various 
degrees. Similarly, the study by Norman et al. (2009) can be enriched by 
analysing the strength of control exhibited by each category of ownership.  
 
This study is a precursor, hopefully, to the greater application of the 
voting power concept in corporate analysis and focused on establishing the 
strength of the voting power concept. GLCs were chosen to illustrate the varying 
strengths of control and the possible ways in which the government managed to 
retain control; namely, the use of friendly partners and dispersed minority 
shareholders. Limitations are unavoidable. For example, how do non-GLCs, 
which can be equally controversial, compare against GLCs? This study indicates 
that members of the Bumiputera group are the main coalition partners of GLCs. 
Is a similar trend exhibited by non-GLCs? Are non-GLCs less reliant on partners 
to retain corporate control? Is a similar incidence of disenfranchised shareholders 
a nationwide phenomenon and to what extent is this true?  
 
Ultimately, after the voting power concept has gained traction as a viable 
method of analysis, the relationship between the relevant indices and a host of 
other variables, such as capital structure, performance, investments and dividend 
policy is open for investigation. 
 
To this end, the differences between the voting power concept and the 
size of shareholding ownership have been discussed. Now the question is; can 
voting power outperform shareholding size? We believe the answer is a 
resounding “yes!”  However, if disagreements persist, at the very least, the 
schisms should be acknowledged.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
1. The size of shareholdings is also the basis of the Herfindahl index – an index that is 
defined as the sum of the squared percentage of shareholding; e.g., in a company with            
4 shareholders of 40, 20, 20 and 20 percent, respectively, the index, i.e., h = (1 × 0.42) + 
(3 × 0.22) = 0.28. The median of this index indicates the degree of concentration and is 
used for cross-industry or cross-country analyses. This index is widely applied. Examples 
include Chakravarty, Goddard and Hodgkinson (2004), who illustrate how the 
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distribution of block holders and the rate of shareholders participation complicate 
corporate voting outcome and Van der Elst (2004), who describes the behaviour among 
selected European countries where company-specific characteristics such as identity of 
the largest shareholders was concluded as likely to influence rent-seeking behaviour.   
 
2.  See Jayaseelan, R. (2013). Fear factor often used in buyout exercises. Retrieved 22 July 
2013 from http://archives.thestar. com.my/services/printerfriendly.asp?file=/2013/2/ 
14/business/12709847.asp&sec=business and The Star. (2013). Petronas offers to take 
MISC private. Retrieved 22 July 2013 from http://www.thestar.com.my/ 
Business/Business-News/2013/02/01/Petronas-offers-to-take-MISC-private-in-
RM88billion-deal.aspx 
 
3.  For example, Morriss (2002) defines power as ‘the ability to do something’ against power 
‘over something’, as advocated by Oppenheim (1978). 
 
4.  When each shareholder has equal weight, the application of this definition would produce 
an exact result. This is known as the Shapley value. The Shapley-Shubik index is a 
special kind of index because of the unequal weight. 
 
5.  BERNAMA. (2011). PM: Appointment of GLC heads based on competence.   Retrieved  
9 February 2011 from http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/2/9/nation/ 
20110209175312&sec=nation 
 
6.  E.g., Leong, H. Y. (2011). Analysts downgrade Malaysia Airlines. Retrieved 27 May 
2011 from http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2011/5/27/business/8768319 
 
7.  PEMANDU. (2011). Corporate Malaysia holds court. Retrieved 13 January 2012 from 
http://etp.pemandu.gov.my/News_-%E2%97%98-_Events-@-Corporate_Malaysia_holds 
_ court.aspx 
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